

# Forging a Non-Violent Mass Movement: Economic Shocks and Organizational Innovations in India's Struggle for Democracy

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## Abstract

We provide the first systematic empirical evidence on factors that successfully mobilized one of the world's first non-violent mass movements in favor of democratic self-government, using novel data from an unlikely venue for such collective action: poor, ethnically-diverse South Asia. We show that residents of exports-producing districts that were negatively impacted by inter-war trade shocks, including the Depression, were more likely to support the Independence Movement in 1937 and 1946 and more likely to engage in violent insurrection in 1942. Further, we show how the nature of mobilization changed dramatically from non-violent to violent immediately after the Movement's leadership was arrested, particularly in districts endowed with a smaller grassroots organizational presence.

We interpret these results as reflecting the role of two factors: trade shocks in forging a mass movement by reconciling agrarian exporters with the Movement's offer of protectionism, land reform and democracy, and an innovative organizational structure, that selected its leaders based upon public sacrifice rather than wealth, in keeping the mass protests peaceful.

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We have a power, a power that cannot be found in Molotov cocktails, but we do have a power.

Power that cannot be found in bullets and in guns, but we do have a power.

It is a power as old as the insights of Jesus of Nazareth and as modern as the techniques of Mohandas K. Gandhi.

– Dr. Martin Luther King<sup>1</sup>

There were moments in the twentieth century when activists believed that a new technology of political organization—that of mass non-violent civil disobedience—had “almost limitless” possibilities for affecting institutional change around the world.<sup>2</sup> The ‘power’ of techniques of non-violent civil disobedience in affecting peaceful political reform and institutional change has been credited with remarkable successes, from democracy and independence in India to the Civil Rights revolution in the United States. However, non-violent civil resistance has also often failed. Modern scholars of civil resistance point to the issue of maintaining ‘nonviolent discipline’ in the face of provocation as an important missing piece in our understanding of how to make civil resistance work.<sup>3</sup> And on the ground, as historic episodes such as the violence of the 1942 ‘Quit India’ movement, the race riots that followed in the wake of the US Civil Rights movement, as well as the Arab Spring and the battles in Tahrir Square demonstrate, movements that begin peacefully are often prone to rapid breakdowns into violence that further facilitates repression (Bhavnani and Jha, 2014)

At the same time, the prominent role that mass mobilization can play in large-scale institutional reform, including revolutions and democratization, has long been emphasized in theories of political development (Engels and Marx, 1848, Boix, 2003, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005, North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009, Jha and Wilkinson, 2012). In parallel, the *lack* of development in many poor societies has been often attributed to a failure to create broad coalitions in favor of beneficial reform, particularly among societies riven by differences in ethnicity, wealth and other dimensions (e.g. Engerman and Sokoloff, 2000, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005a, Rajan, 2006, Jha, 2011). Non-violent mass mobilization, in particular, is often seen both by scholars and policymakers as a desirable and potentially effective means of political reform. Indeed, cross-country evidence suggests that mass movements that have successfully remained non-violent do in fact appear more likely

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<sup>1</sup>Transcribed from “King: Montgomery to Memphis: A Digital Archive”, 1970, Kino.

<sup>2</sup>See, for example, the views of Rev. Jim Lawson, a key organizer of workshops building upon Gandhian non-violence techniques that resulted in the Nashville sit-in protests early in the US Civil Rights Movement (Halberstam, 1998)[pg.27]

<sup>3</sup>See, for example, the very useful overview in Schock (2013, pg.284) and Chenoweth and Cunningham (2013). On civil disobedience more generally, see Helvey (eg 2004), Sharp (eg 2005), Schock (eg 2005), Shaykhutdinov (eg 2010), Chenoweth and Stephan (eg 2011).

to achieve their political reform objectives than movements that become violent (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011).

However, much less is known about the factors that have been successful in engendering broad-based mass mobilization in poor, ethnically diverse societies and that are successful in keeping mass movements non-violent. Mobilization in poor ethnically diverse societies often has a tendency to be sectarian rather than spanning ethnic divisions (eg Esteban and Ray, 2007, Eifert, Miguel and Posner, 2010). Further, when non-violent mass protests are aimed at political reform and are already explicitly illegal, there are often grave challenges for organizers of non-violent protests to maintain the discipline necessary to prevent such protests deteriorating into violence, whether in response to the brutality of law enforcement, the attraction of protestors with low thresholds for engaging in violence, or under the instigation of political agents that might gain from sectarian violence rather than broader cooperation. Further, the threat of “letting the genie out of the bottle”—that mass movements, once organized, are hard to de-escalate and can turn on those that once led them—has often deterred those with organizational resources from taking this path.<sup>4</sup>

In this paper, we provide the first systematic empirical analysis of the determinants of mass non-violent mobilization during the struggle of the diverse inhabitants of the Indian sub-continent for democratic self-determination and political independence from Great Britain.<sup>5</sup> India’s successful struggle for democratic self-determination and independence from Britain marked the first major reversal of a global process of colonization and market integration by Europeans that had been continuing since the early nineteenth century (Figure 1), making it a prominent example for future civil rights and independence movements around the world.

India’s independence struggle poses a number of intriguing puzzles for social science. Surprisingly, both for contemporary observers like Winston Churchill and scholars of collective action and nationalism, India’s independence struggle emerged in 1930-33 as one of the world’s first mass non-violent political movements, despite low prevailing literacy rates and remarkably high ethnolinguistic diversity, factors often associated with *lowered* propensities

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<sup>4</sup>The fate of political actors seeking to manipulate and control Parisians and their militia, the *gardes françaises* during the French Revolution is of course history’s most prominent cautionary tale in this regard (see eg Schama, 1989). Indeed, it was a dispute over whether the Indian National Congress should be an elite movement or whether it should attempt mass mobilization that led to Muhammad Ali Jinnah, one of its most promising members and a proponent of the former view, to leave the organization.

<sup>5</sup>In what follows, we follow contemporary usage and refer to that portion of the Indian subcontinent under direct or indirect British rule as ‘India,’ encompassing contemporary India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Though, citizens in all three future states mobilized politically for democratic self-determination, independent India was the only one of these to maintain its democracy in the years immediately following 1947. As we will discuss, the coalition that drove the Independence of India, the Congress party, derived its support from different economic interests with different objectives than the Muslim League that would govern Pakistan, having arguably long-term effects on both land reform and the consolidation of democracy in the independent South Asian states.




Figure 1: **World trends in decolonization**

The vertical line marks the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947.

for cooperative political collective action and higher chances, instead, of ethnic conflict (eg Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005, Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005, Gellner, 1983, Anderson, 1983). Perhaps even more surprising was the ability of organizers of the movement in this period to not only build a mass coalition but to keep this movement largely non-violent, and to in fact de-escalate the movement when violent episodes occurred.

The struggle also poses some interesting puzzles from the perspective of trade theory. That the platform of the Independence Movement, as embodied by the Indian National Congress, was avowedly autarkic, is perhaps not surprising given that its financial backers were largely industrialists that stood to gain from protection (eg Grossman and Helpman, 1994). Yet what is more surprising is that this platform still proved broadly popular even though a robust conclusion of most trade theories, as well as significant cross-country evidence, is that India's abundant factor— rural agriculturalists— should favour free trade (Stolper and Samuelson, 1941, Rogowski, 1990, Hiscox, 2002, O'Rourke and Taylor, 2006, López-Córdova and Meissner, 2008, Milner and Mukherjee, 2009).<sup>6</sup> Yet despite British

<sup>6</sup>The intuition is that because free trade favors the abundant factor, this should raise the value of labor in labor-abundant societies. Thus, in a Stolper-Samuelson world with perfect labour mobility, workers should prefer free trade, and in labor-abundant societies, workers will include the median voter. Even assuming fixed factors, as in a Ricardo-Viner framework, free trade would benefit India's majority— in the form of rural agriculture.

concessions to India’s 1930-31 mass civil disobedience campaign that would include provincial legislatures with substantial local autonomy, India was to continue to witness mass mobilization, often at high risk, by both rich and poor, rural and urban, in favor of seizing Britain’s remaining imperial rights over trade and foreign policy, with the avowed aim of complete independence (*Purna Swaraj*). A large coalition of Indians chose not to take the path of self-governing dominion within the empire offered by the British, a path trod by Australia and Canada, with its accompanying ease of access to within-empire trade and immigration.

How and why then did a broad coalition of South Asians form across ethnolinguistic and economic lines to push for democratic self-determination? How was this coalition successful at maintaining a non-violent mass movement and why did it also, at times, fail? In this paper, we provide the first systematic evidence on the relative importance of economic, cultural and organizational factors in mobilizing the Indian subcontinent’s remarkably diverse population into one of the world’s first non-violent mass movements in favor of democratic self-government. We exploit a range of hitherto untapped subnational (administrative district-level) data sources, assembling novel data on mobilization in favor of democratic self-determination, including votes and turnout in the first provincial elections in 1937, secret intelligence reports on violent insurrection and non-violent protest during the “Great Rebellion” of 1942 against British rule, and Congress membership on the eve of Independence in 1946. These data are supplemented with Depression-era district level data on ethnicity and religion, crop-growing patterns, agricultural yields and employment in import and export crops, manufactures, and inputs into nationalism, such as the presence of journalists.

First we demonstrate that residents of exports-producing districts that were negatively impacted by shocks to the value of the goods they produced between 1923 (the last business as usual year (Appleyard, 2006)) and 1931 (just after the main impact of the Great Depression was felt) were more likely to support the Independence movement, as embodied by the Indian National Congress, in 1937 and 1946 and more likely to mobilize en masse in the Quit India rebellion of 1942. However, districts experiencing both positive and extreme negative world trade shocks were associated with lowered support.

Next, we use data on the timing and distribution of violent and non-violent action during the Quit India rebellion to measure the effects of the Congress organization on non-violence. Measuring the effects of organizations is often difficult, as organizations emerge endogenously. Our strategy is instead to evaluate the effects of the Congress organization structure by comparing the degree of violence in mobilization just prior and just following a British policy to simultaneously sweep and arrest known Congress organizational cadres (around 60,000 people) on August 9th 1942, hours after the Congress declared mass civil disobedience with the aim of having the British “Quit India”. This, we show led immediately from non-




Figure 2: **Non-violent and violent protest in the Quit India “Rebellion” of 1942**

Approximately, 60,000 Congress organizers, including the entire national leadership, were arrested and sequestered in a nationwide sweep on August 9th, the day after the first protests. Despite heavy censorship of these actions, non-violent protests were immediately replaced by violent mobilization. Source: Own calculations, based upon secret intelligence reports for each province.

violent protests the day before to turn violent the day after the arrests, and led to a gradual decay in new attempts at non-violent action in the weeks that followed, even while violent protests continued to be widespread (Figure 2 previews these results). Further, using a list of grassroots Congress organizations banned by the British in each district during the 1930s mobilization, we document that the switch from non-violent to violent protests in 1942 was lower in districts with a greater number of historically banned grassroots organizations.

We interpret our results as consistent with the importance of two particular features—trade shocks and the organizational incentives and leadership of the non-violent movement—in aligning the interests of disparate groups and providing the organizational capacity for them to mobilize non-violently and en masse in favor of broad institutional change. We argue that while the gainers from imperial preferences and those worst affected by export shocks were the natural beneficiaries of empire, moderate negative world trade shocks reduced the benefits from trade openness to many Indian agricultural labourers and thus their gains from the British colonial system. Instead of a system based upon (limited) imperial rule, trade openness and trade intermediaries such as landlords, the incentives of Indian agricultural labourers became more aligned with industrialists backing the Congress platform of political independence and protectionism. To forge a mass movement and to compensate Indian agriculturalists for the resultant closing of international trade opportunities, Congress was

able during the Great Depression to make a more attractive promise of land reform that democratic rule would make credible. It was this deal, bringing together elites and non-elites, and urban and rural interests, that helped forge one of the world's first mass political movements and, we argue, has shaped India's political economy ever since.

Further, we argue that the contrast between the mass non-violent mobilization at the beginning of the Quit India rebellion with the abrupt rise in violent mobilization immediately after the arrest of the organizational leadership is consistent with the key role of the Congress organization in keeping the mass movement from degenerating into violence.

We draw upon historical sources to clarify how the Congress organization played this difficult role.<sup>7</sup> We suggest that the centralized selection and incentive mechanisms developed by the Congress organization, beginning with its 1919 reforms under Gandhi's influence, may have played a major role in maintaining non-violent discipline. These reforms included linking the prospects for promotion and high office within the organization to costly acts of renunciation, such as the resignation of government office, courting arrest and spending time in prison for non-violent civil disobedience. We argue that these reforms are consistent with a clubs good interpretation of public sacrifice as a movement-specific screening device (Iannaccone, 1992) that selected local leaders more likely to forgo temptations to exploit the mass movement for personal gain, and reduced their outside options within the existing system. Both mechanisms are likely to have led them to be more willing to accept central instructions to de-escalate and to check others with potential temptations for violence. These incentives also provided a path for non-elites to advance in the Movement through personal sacrifice rather than limiting it to those with money, caste or elite status. Such a centralized organizational structure, we argue, was critical for the Movement's successful implementation of maintaining mass non-violent civil disobedience in 1930-31 but also led to the violent failure of the Quit India movement when the national leadership was arrested simultaneously in 1942. The resilience of non-violence to these arrests in districts with more endowed grassroots organizations suggests a tradeoff between incentives and the threat of decapitation in the design of robust non-violent organizations.

Beyond trade and organizations, our results enable us to evaluate key competing explanations. We argue that the fact that those hit by the worst economic shocks did not appear to be mobilizing for Independence suggests the need to nuance a pure economic shock interpretation of India's mobilization due to lowered opportunity costs, greater grievance or a 'peasant rebellion' of those pushed to the corner by the Great Depression (eg Rothermund, 1992).<sup>8</sup> Further we find a lowered relative importance in our context of other cultural and

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<sup>7</sup>[this section is in progress].

<sup>8</sup>This is not to say that such a mechanism might not be plausible in other contexts (as in eg Miguel,

human capital factors that are often emphasized to favour nationalism and political collective action, such as higher literacy rates, the presence of journalists and the media or greater religious and ethnic homogeneity (eg Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005, Anderson, 1983, Gellner, 1983).

Our paper provides evidence for a novel interpretation for the movement that led to the democratic self-determination of one-fifth of the world’s population, and also contributes to the social science literatures on civil disobedience and private politics, the role of coalition formation in institutional change, on democratization and trade as well as on decolonization.

As discussed above, shocks that encourage mass mobilization play a fundamental role in many prominent theories of institutional change (Lipset, 1960, Moore, 1966, Boix, 2003, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005). While the particular importance of trade shocks has been emphasized in encouraging the relative empowerment of trading groups in engendering change (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005b, Jha, 2008), and of democratization as a provider of credible commitment to redistribution (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000), less work has focused on the role of trade shocks in aligning the interests of sub-groups possessing the capital and the labor necessary for successful mobilization in favor of democratic self-determination.<sup>9</sup>

This paper also contributes to a large—mainly practitioner-oriented, but also academic—literature on non-violence (Helvey, 2004, Sharp, 1973, 2005, Schock, 2005). Although this literature has focused on describing the strategic logic of non-violence (Ackerman and Krueger, 1994, Ganz, 2010), and has enumerated its numerous tactics (Helvey, 2004, Sharp, 1973), more recent works document cross-national patterns of non-violent versus violent mobilization, including examining their patterns of use and their relative efficacy (Shaykhutdinov, 2010, Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008, Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). A striking finding from this literature is that non-violent mobilization is, on average, more effective than violent mobilization (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008). However, less is known about how and why non-violent movements succeed at remaining non-violent. We build on this literature to argue for the particular importance of aligned incentives between movement leaders and followers, which makes mass mobilization possible, and also for the importance of the movement’s organizational design. We argue that in the Indian Independence Movement, reforms that created club goods incentives, particularly those that select local leaders through visible group-specific sacrifice, were important in keeping the mass movement from degenerating

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Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004, Dal Bo and Dal Bo, 2004, Dube and Vargas, 2008).

<sup>9</sup>Indeed, there are reasons to expect that, in the absence of such trade shocks and the possibility of future redistribution, the complementarity between capital and labor in mobilization may have made *ethnic*-based mobilization more likely (Esteban and Ray, 2008).



into mob violence.<sup>10</sup>

We also build upon and contribute to an important literature in the political economy of trade that finds, consistent with the Stolper-Samuelson intuition, that labor-intensive democracies tend to have lower trade barriers, and in turn that variation in world trade volumes (Rogowski, 1990, Hiscox, 2002, Ahlquist and Wibbels, 2010), colonial legacies, or natural openness to trade (Eichengreen and Leblang, 2008, López-Córdova and Meissner, 2008) explain democratization.<sup>11</sup> We break new ground and look at within- country, rather than cross- country variation, which enables us to build upon and reconcile these works with the puzzling coincidence between the movement of South Asian and many other post-Independence countries towards both increased democratic self-determination and higher trade barriers. We solve the puzzle of how the India’s mass movement towards nationalism and autarky encompassed India’s abundant factor and natural constituency of trade openness—rural agricultural labour—through the interaction between negative trade shocks—that reduce the economic benefits to labour from trade intermediaries like landlords—and democratization, which made redistribution of the assets of these intermediaries credible.<sup>12</sup>

Finally, by assembling novel data, which includes, to the best of our knowledge, the first comprehensive assembly of archival intelligence data on the extent of non-violent and violent insurrection in the war-time Quit India rebellion, we contribute to Indian history. The two major strands of existing Indian historiography emphasize either the metropole’s reasons for granting India independence (see, e.g., the *Transfer of Power* series published by the U.K. government—Mansergh (1976)), or provide thick description of the micro-politics of the movement in India (see the *Towards Freedom* series published by the Indian Council for Historical Research—Gupta, ed (2010), Prasad, ed (2008), Panikkar, ed (2009), Gupta

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<sup>10</sup>For a related organizational theory of violent conflict, see Weinstein (2007). We also naturally build upon an extensive literature on social movements in sociology, particularly papers that compare the mobilization of social organizations in protests based upon the role of differential political opportunities and grievance, of social embeddedness, of organizational ecology, inter-movement competition and other factors (see, for example Larson and Soule, 2009).

<sup>11</sup>Milner and Mukherjee (2009) provides a very useful overview.

<sup>12</sup>By examining subnational variation in support for independence, we also contribute to the literature on decolonization. These works have emphasized the metropole’s interests (Lustick, 1993), the inevitable growth of nationalism (Brubaker, 1996), the obstruction of demands for representation (Lawrence, 2007), state weakness (Lawrence, 2007), changes in international norms (Hailey, 1943), or the destruction wrought by World War II (Clayton, 1994) in explaining variation in decolonization. Given that our use of a single case holds these factors constant, what then explains variation in support for independence? We argue that Indians had economic reasons to be rid of the Raj, and that variation in these interests explain variation in support for independence. India is a particularly good case with which to study the drivers of decolonization since, being the first major decolonization since the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars in Latin America, its decolonization could not have been subject to spillover effects from elsewhere (Figure 1). India’s independence, on the hand, is often said to have inspired other anti-colonial movements (Rothermund, 2006). Instead, our analysis has intriguing parallels with recent theoretical work that emphasizes the disincentive to independence due to the potential loss of a metropole’s trade with the colony (Bonfatti, 2010).

and Dev, eds (2010)). These literatures, respectively, mention the Great Depression as a factor weakening Britain’s will to rule India, and as a cause of a “peasant movement” in the inter-war years, which provided the elite-led independence movement with the masses it needed (Rothermund, 1992, 2006). We are able to test the latter claim empirically, and find it incomplete as an explanation. Instead, we are able to propose and begin to test a novel interpretation, based upon on the political economy of India’s trade and ‘Gandhi’s Gift’—particularly innovations in the organization of non-violent civil disobedience— to explain not only one of the pivotal historical episodes in the political and economic destinies of one-fifth of the world’s population, but also why and how there was a peaceful mass mobilization in favor of democratic self-determination that has since served as a central example to freedom struggles around the world.

We start by outlining our alternative account of the Indian Independence movement. The next section details the unique data and empirical strategy that we rely on. We then present our results, and conclude. An appendix provides alternative specifications and robustness checks.

## **An account of the Indian independence movement**

India’s independence movement can be divided into three distinct epochs, which can be characterized by two dimensions: the organization of the Congress movement, and the type of grassroots mobilization. These include an elite Congress with low level violent sedition (ca 1890s- 1919), a reorganized Congress with disproportionately urban participation (1919-30), and, we will show, a Congress able to command both urban and rural mass participation (from 1930 onwards).

Prior to 1919, it was unclear how important the Indian National Congress (INC) would be for Indian politics. The INC was an elite group, financed and dominated mainly by affluent English-speaking professionals, particularly lawyers and businessmen—who made their living largely from India’s triangular trade with Britain and China (Krishna, 1966). This elite group pushed for greater Indian consultation on government within the British Empire.

In parallel with this organization were regional groups of more extreme nationalists, whom through newspapers and terrorist acts, conducted a campaign for Independence. As the official Sedition Committee (1918) Report suggests (pg 10), a number of these regional nationalist groups were following the playbooks of European nationalism. Vinayak D. Savarkar, later to be a key figure in the *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (RSS), a Hindu nationalist group, translated the autobiography of the architect of Italian nationalism, Giuseppe Mazzini, into

Marathi, along with his annotations, with an initial print run of 2000 copies in 1907.<sup>13</sup>

Yet, prior to 1919, nationalism in India appears to have failed for precisely the reasons that scholars of nationalism and collective action might expect: high degrees of ethnolinguistic diversity that impedes collective action and the development of transcendent symbols and low literacy rates that impede the creation of a national ‘high culture’. For example, the prominent nationalist “Lokmanya” Bal Gangadhar Tilak in Poona used his newspaper *Kesari* (Saffron) to propagate nationalism, most notably by adopting Hindu symbols, such as promoting a minor festival for the god Ganesha into a major religious and political event, and promoting the exemplar of the Maratha ruler Shivaji Bhosle, who had fought the Mughal empire. Both of these symbols appear to have been aimed at forging a Hindu ‘imagined community’ and coincided with Hindu- Muslim rioting (eg Jaffrelot, 2005). The newspaper’s circulation remained limited regionally. Even among Hindus, Tilak’s attempts to propagate Shivaji, a local ruler, as a symbol of nationalist resistance in Bengal, on the other side of the sub-continent, met with little success (Sedition Committee, 1918)[pg.19].<sup>14</sup>

This first phase- combining a small and almost exclusively elite-led Congress agitating peacefully even while low level violent sedition, bomb-throwing and other acts of terrorism was being perpetrated mainly by those outside the Congress organization, lasted until around 1919. This was a period when arguably grievances were particularly accentuated, since the declaration by the Viceroy Lord Montagu that India would receive dominion status (i.e. self-government) in return for military support during the First World War was reneged upon, and instead, in response to the Sedition Committee (1918) Report, the government imposed a series of laws, named for the president of the Report, S.A.T. Rowlatt, aimed at curtailing ‘sedition’ and limiting public assembly.<sup>15</sup>

It was then that Mohandas Gandhi, later called *Mahatma*, returned from South Africa and introduced the techniques of non-violent civil disobedience to the sub-Continent as well

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<sup>13</sup>According to Sedition Committee (1918)[pg 10], his brother, Ganesh Savarkar was found after his arrest in 1909 with a “ a much-scored copy of Frost’s *Secret Societies of European Revolution, 1776 to 1876* ... in which is described the secret organisation of the Russian nihilists consisting of small circles or groups affiliated into sections, each member knowing only the members of the group to which he belonged. In accordance apparently with this scheme the Nasik conspiracy involved the existence of various small groups of young men working for the same object and drawing weapons from the same source without personal acquaintance with the members of other groups.”

<sup>14</sup>Bengal was also viewed by the British as a key center for nationalism in this period, mainly focused upon an urbanized affluent elite, known as the *bhadralok*, or “respectable ones”. Religious reformers such as Swami Vivekananda, who suggested a philosophical Hinduism, and Rabindranath Tagore and other Bengali intellectuals provided common identities that could form an alternative ‘imagined community’.

<sup>15</sup>The fact that Britain, which possessed one of Western Europe’s most restrictive franchises in 1914, extended the democratic franchise to poor males within the British Isles in February 1918, prior to the end of the First World War was not lost on Congress’s leaders, with fateful consequences for the Quit India rebellion.

Year	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923
Members	160	162	163	338	338
% Lawyers	65.00	64.81	50.92	23.08	21.30
% Journalists	7.50	7.41	11.66	6.21	8.58
% Businessmen	6.88	7.41	8.59	5.62	4.44
% Doctors	4.38	3.70	4.29	4.73	4.73
% Landowners	4.38	4.94	2.45	2.37	1.48
% Teachers	3.75	3.09	4.29	2.96	2.96
% Others	5.00	5.56	6.13	6.80	6.51
% Congress Workers	0.00	0.00	0.61	4.44	7.99
% Not Known	3.13	3.09	11.04	43.79	42.01

Table 1: **Composition of Delegates to the All-India Congress Committee, 1919-24**

Source: Bhavnani and Jha (2014), based upon Krishna (1966)(pg424). During Gandhi’s reforms of the Congress movements, the proportion of lawyers dropped considerably, while those not prominent to be classified (likely non-elites) rose.

as pushing for, and obtaining a broad reform of the Congress organization.<sup>16</sup> Congress went through a large scale reorganization during the period 1919-23, adopting a new constitution that changed its steering body, the *All-India Congress Committee* from dominated mainly by elites, particularly lawyers (65%) in 1919 to one that was representatively elected from district Congress committees which had emerged to span British India by 1923 (Krishna, 1966)[pg 424]. The organization extended down to the *taluk* and village level, where each village with more than five Congress members, was entitled to a committee and to send delegates to the taluk and district. At the same time, at Gandhi’s instigation, the Congress created a strong central institution– the *Congress Working Committee* (Krishna, 1966).

Following Gandhi’s reforms in 1920, members of these committees of the Indian National Congress were required to give up any positions that they enjoyed with the British government and lawyers in the leadership were denied the right to practice law. Engaging in non-violent civil disobedience that could lead to arrest and the accompanying prison time became an organization-specific investment. As the historian Gopal Krishna (1966) describes the evolution of the Congress organization:

The significant difference between the pre-1920 and the post-1920 Congress leadership lay in the fact that before 1920 it was social position which automatically conferred a leading role in the movement; after 1920 it was the renunciation of

<sup>16</sup>The concept of civil disobedience goes back at least to a famous pamphlet of Henry Thoreau (1849), who argued that it is a moral responsibility of citizens to passively resist unjust laws. Gandhi may have also been influenced by the smaller scale civil disobedience of the Suffragette movement and Tolstoy’s views on non-violence (Lelyveld, 2011). Gandhi himself came from the Gujarati medieval port of Porbandar, an environment with a long legacy of inter-ethnic complementarities between Hindus and Muslim traders and organizations supporting ethnic tolerance. Gandhi got his start in South Africa working as a lawyer for Porbandari Muslim traders. His mother was of the Pranami sect, a syncretic sect of Hinduism that preached the oneness of religions (Jha, 2013b).

social position and the demonstration of willingness to accept sacrifices that was demanded of those who aspired to lead. It was through their national outlook and renunciation of their privileges that Congress leaders even though by caste and education they belonged to a small section of the population, came to represent the nation and not only their own class ... (pg 425)

Important work beginning with Iannaccone (1992) has pointed to costly investments or ‘sacrifices’ in group-specific identity as a form of screening device in cults and clubs, where a key objective is to maintain small group size and screen for the most productive members. This logic has been found to particularly applicable to violent mobilization along ethnic and religious lines, including among organized crime and terrorist organizations (eg Berman and Laitin, 2008). The challenge can be to find a group-specific investment, with violent acts and crimes that reduce a member’s outside option often playing that role. We suggest that civil disobedience provides a dimension– public sacrifice, including incarceration and ‘turning the other cheek’ when faced with brutal law enforcement– that ironically has a similar clubs good structure but *can transcend sectarian and ethno-linguistic differences and also facilitate non-violence*. Political incarceration provided a movement-specific investment that was potentially open to all, regardless of their initial cultural and resource endowments. Though India’s leaders would continue to come from particular castes and education levels, they did not necessarily have to be rich.

The reorganization of the Congress was Gandhi’s first attempt at mass non-cooperation. This occurred in part to challenge the Rowlatt Acts that made protests illegal, but also to create solidarity with the Muslim community. With the Ottoman Sultan– the titular Caliph of Sunni Islam– having joined the losing side in the War, Britain had to decide whether to keep him in power or depose him. Pan-Islamic nationalists, many of whom were concentrated in India, formed the *Khilafat* (Caliphate) conference to pressure Britain into maintaining the Caliph’s authority. Arguing that national unity required mass mobilization on both Hindus and Muslims on this issue, Gandhi asked “how can twenty-two *crore* (twenty-two million) Hindus have peace and happiness if eight *crore* of their Muslim brethren are torn in anguish?” (Lelyveld, 2011)[p.157]. As we discuss in our book project (Bhavnani and Jha, book project, in progress), despite having developed a sub-continental organization, the combined non-cooperation - Khilafat movement was small scale– particularly compared to those that came after– and though Gandhi himself attracted large crowds, the movement itself failed to attract much concrete civil disobedience outside India’s towns.

An important test of the Congress organization came on February 4, 1922. A joint Khilafat / Non-Cooperation Movement non-violent protest in the town of Chauri Chawra was fired upon by police, leading to the deaths of three protestors. The demonstrators

became a mob, which burned down the police station with the police inside, killing 22 policemen. Gandhi, and with him, the Congress Working Committee, immediately called a halt to the non-cooperation movement, and was effective in implementing this nationwide.

Ultimately, however, the non-cooperation movement and the Khilafat agitation failed to achieve significant reforms.<sup>17</sup> Further, the mobilization that did occur may have proved counter-productive. There was a breakdown of cooperation between the Muslim Khilafat movement and the mainly Hindu Congress. Local politicians appeared to have taken advantage of the new era of mass mobilization, and towns that had never experienced Hindu-Muslim rioting succumbed for the first time in the aftermath (Figure 3).




Figure 3: **Satyagraha Movements and Hindu Muslim Riots** Source: Jha (2013a), and Wilkinson (2005)

We argue that the Congress, under Gandhi's influence, developed the basic organization and techniques for non-violence in this first attempt at nationwide mass civil disobedience. However, an underlying lack of aligned incentives, both between the movements, and between the non-cooperation movement and many that it hoped to mobilize, may have played a key role both in the limited success of the movement and in the ethnic conflict that resulted where its mobilization efforts had met success.

<sup>17</sup>Kemal Ataturk would depose the Ottoman Sultan, relieving the British of the responsibility and removing the main reason for the Muslim mobilization.



Figure 4: **India's trade with the British Empire**

Source: Mitchell: Historical Statistics

It is likely that a key reason for the lack of mobilization is that many Indians actually benefited from Britain's stewardship of government and trade openness, particularly relative to the platform of protectionism promised by the Congress. Ironically, though, 1923, the year after the Non-Cooperation Movement failed, was to be seen as the last "business-as-usual" year under the broadly free trade regime that India had become accustomed to as a colony of the United Kingdom (Appleyard, 1968, 2006).

We will provide evidence that the policies and external trade shocks that followed appear to have been important in reducing the gains many Indians enjoyed from the Empire, and made more attractive and feasible Congress' promise of a new deal. The United Kingdom's return to the gold standard at pre-war (and according to John Maynard Keynes, overvalued) parity in 1925 began a series of questionable British policies. With the rupee pegged to sterling, and Britain entering a recession, the result was a substantial reduction of India's exports to Great Britain and the world. This contraction was then compounded by the global Depression, which started in 1929. An indication of the economic tumult of the time comes from the the total value of imports into the United Kingdom from British India: these nearly halved from £67 million in 1923 to £37 million in 1931 (see also Figure 4). The contraction in India's external trade affected practically every sector of the Indian economy, and, as we will show, the dynamics of the independence movement as well.

The negative effect of this tumult was exacerbated by the Raj's external-sector responses, which increasingly reflected Britain's economic and security imperatives more than India's needs.<sup>18</sup> The first of these responses had to do with exchange rate. Britain abandoned the gold standard in September 1931, effectively devaluing the pound, while at the same insisting that the rupee remain pegged to sterling at its existing high value.<sup>19</sup> This allowed Britain to reflate its economy—a policy that practically all the world followed—at the expense of India's economy. British exports to India were favored over India's exports to the world, and a massive outflow of gold from the country and to Britain followed.<sup>20</sup> Existing deflationary pressures due to the collapse in demand due to the Great Depression were, in effect, exacerbated by the Empire's exchange rate policy.

The second external-sector response to the Great Depression was an abandoning of free trade. The 1931 "Ottawa Agreement" established "imperial preferences" between Britain and her colonies. The Empire would operate as a preferential-trade zone, with the high tariffs to non-members, and preferential ones for members. The agreement offered the British the cover with which to extract low Indian import duties for 160 of its manufactures, while agreeing to similar terms for a smaller number of Indian raw material exports (Rothermund, 1992)(p.147). While the former created opposition to Empire, the latter created—as we detail below—new supporters of Empire.

British policy led to the segmentation of India's populace into at least three distinct interests, each of which reacted to the regime in different ways and for different reasons. We consider each of these in turn, detailing how their interests were affected by the Great Depression, the overvaluation of the rupee, and the Ottawa agreement. The first group were India's "protected exporters" who received preferential access to British markets under the terms of the Ottawa agreement. This group mainly exported those Indian commodities that the British turned to when in Depression: drugs, tea, coffee and tobacco. These were grown, perhaps not coincidentally, chiefly on British-owned plantations in India. Since this group continued to do well during the inter-war years, they were likely to be hostile to the Congress

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<sup>18</sup>Rothermund (1992) provides a compelling account of how the Finance Member of the colonial government based in India, George Schuster, sought a devaluation of the rupee relative to sterling to restore the competitiveness of Indian exports, but was over-ruled by the Secretary of State for India based in London.

<sup>19</sup>This stands in contrast to the devaluations that the dominions of Australia and New Zealand were able to pursue.

<sup>20</sup>Indians have been among the world's largest purchasers of gold for much of recorded history, this remarkable appetite exciting comment from Roman observers such as Pliny and seventeenth century English mercantilists such as Josiah Child. Only twice are there records that the net flow of gold to India was reversed— in the Great Depression, and with unprecedentedly high gold prices in the 21st century. That Indians reversed this flow during the Great Depression, and were selling what was culturally seen as the ultimate store of emergency wealth to cushion economic shocks is indicative of how profound these effects were at the household level.






Figure 5: **Changes in food vs non-food crop acreage**

Source: Agricultural Censuses, 1929-1935

party and its plans for independence.

The second group were India's "unprotected exporters", which included the bulk of the population. This group included the producers of staples, such as wheat and rice, and of export cash crops such as cotton, indigo and jute. This constituency faced a fall in the demand for their products due to Britain's control over the exchange rate and due to the Depression. As long as this group remained oriented towards the export economy, its interests likely remained aligned with the British. Farmers, however, began to switch from growing for export to subsistence farming (Figure 5).

By doing so, they reduced their reliance on world demand, and, therefore, both the trade and extension services provided by various intermediaries, including landlords, and trade openness policy of the British. The Congress party appears to have seized upon the reduced enthusiasm of this group for the Raj, and promised them land redistribution, from the now redundant landlord class. Indeed, Jawaharlal Nehru became the first major political figure to speak on the need for land reforms in 1929, a topic that became a key part of the Congress platform not long afterwards (Malaviya, 1954). While the agricultural labour provided the 'mass' of the independence mass movement, the movement also needed capital.<sup>21</sup> This was

<sup>21</sup>The Congress's need for large amounts of funds to sustain the mass movement extended even to maintaining Mahatma Gandhi's asceticism, with the Congress, worried about security, buying up whole railway

provided by the third group affected by turmoil of this period—the owners of India’s infant industries. India’s “import substituters” always had strong incentives to wrest Britain’s control of India’s external policy from Britain, since they were provided little protection for much of Britain’s rule.<sup>22</sup> They enjoyed an abrupt rise in demand for manufactures during World War I, due to the country’s mobilization, and its needs to save foreign exchange. Their grievances may have also been compounded in this period, due to rupee’s revaluation in 1925, and because of the Ottawa agreement, which instituted preferential tariffs on manufactures from Britain. Both policies disadvantaged domestic manufacturers in their domestic market. The only way to wrest control of such policies, was in fact, to sue for complete independence. Indeed, it was as the Great Depression struck, on January 26th 1930—thenceforth celebrated as Independence Day—that Congress officially changed its platform from self-government within the British empire to *Purna Swaraj*, and initiated its next great attempt at mass mobilization—the Civil Disobedience Movement. Interestingly, as the Congress’ Declaration of Independence reveals, economic conditions, including exchange rate policies, taxes and growth were emphasised over nationalist rhetoric as reasons for the Movement (please the Appendix)<sup>23</sup> It is this Movement, enjoying both the Congress’ organization, and for the first time, the aligned incentives of the poor in both rural and urban sectors, that we argue proved the most successful of all of Gandhi’s campaigns. Beginning with the symbolic Salt March and ending with a ‘Pact’ between Gandhi and the Viceroy, Lord Irwin, for substantial autonomy in exchange for calling off the movement, Civil Disobedience precipitated the Government of India Act of 1935 that would grant India its first democratic elections with a substantial franchise two years later.

In an important book, Ronald Rogowski (1990) argues, consistent with the Stolper-Samuelson intuition, that a fall in world trade as occurred during the Depression, may have given the possessors of the scarce factors—capital and land—the rents and resources with which to push for independence, via the Congress party. Yet, while it is likely that there was an assertiveness of domestic capitalists seeking protection, India did not become a ‘Fascist’ state controlled by a coalition of landlords and capitalists. Two years later, Jawaharlal Nehru characterized the nature of the coalition that emerged in the Civil Disobedience Movement:

Civil Disobedience in India has been a historic struggle; it has certainly not been a class struggle. It has definitely been a middle class movement with a peasant

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compartments to allow Gandhi to travel Third Class. Congress President Sarojini Naidu famously asked Gandhi “if you knew, Bapuji, how much it costs to keep you in poverty.”

<sup>22</sup>See Krishna (1966) on the named funders of the Tilak Swaraj Fund.

<sup>23</sup>Celebrations of India’s “Independence Day” would continue until 1947. Lord Mountbatten chose instead August 15th as this was the anniversary of his greatest triumph—the surrender of Japan. Later January 26th was rehabilitated as India’s Republic Day.

backing. It could not, therefore, separate the classes as a class movement would have done. Yet, even in this national movement, there was to some extent a lining up of classes. Some of these, like the feudal princes, the *taluqdars* and big *zamindars* [landlords] aligned themselves completely with the [British] Government, preferring their class interest to national freedom. *Glimpses in World History*, cited in Malaviya (1954)[pg. 55].<sup>24</sup>

## Data and empirical strategy

It is the alignment of interests, born of external trade shocks, and the development of an organization capable of mass non-violent mobilization, that we argue, played crucial roles in India’s remarkable non-violent struggle for democracy. We will begin by providing evidence for the importance of economic shocks in providing the incentives for mobilization, and then exploit detailed data on violence and non-violent protests in 1942 to demonstrate the importance of movement’s organization in keeping the movement peaceful.

We seek to measure the effect of trade shocks due to the Great Depression and the institution of British protectionist “imperial preferences” on support or opposition to the Indian National Congress, the main party of the Indian independence movement. The ideal comparison would be to compare two districts with same levels of initial exposure to foreign trade during the free trade regime of the 1920s, one of which received protection under “imperial preferences” during the Great Depression, and one that did not. A third comparison category are those districts which did not produce goods for export under free trade, and whose producers were relatively insulated from the costs and benefits of imperial preferences.

Our benchmark specification will be cross-sectional regressions of the following form:

$$M_{1936,d} = \gamma_1 \bar{V}_{1920-23}^d + \gamma_2 S_{1923-1933}^d + X'\zeta + \epsilon_d \quad (1)$$

where  $M$  are measures of mobilization,  $\bar{V}^d$  is the average value of export goods per worker in a district between 1920 and 1923,  $S$  is the percentage shock to the value of export goods per person in a district due to the Great Depression and the imperial preference regime,  $X$  are controls including provincial fixed effects,  $\epsilon_d$  are unobserved factors that may drive mobilization that we assume to be independent between provinces but allow to be arbitrarily correlated (clustered) within them, and  $d$  indexes administrative districts, which is the level

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<sup>24</sup>While Rogowski’s general analysis may not precisely fit the unusual coalition that emerged in India, it does arguably provide a closer prediction of the coalition that would subsequently rule Pakistan. Nor is India’s story precisely like that of Latin America in the 1930s, where the large industrial urban sector was able to politically dominate and protectionist industrialization at the expense of exporters (Diaz Alejandro, 1984, Frieden, 2006)[chp 13].

for our analysis.

We employ four new measures of colonial era mobilization in our analysis. One of these—turnout during the 1937 elections—is a measure of overall mobilization. The other three—Congress party support in the 1937 provincial elections, violent and non-violent political activities during the Quit India “rebellion” of 1942, and Congress party membership in 1946—are measures of support for independence. The Congress Party membership data were taken from the organization’s membership handbook; 1937 election data were taken from the official election returns, and the Quit India data were drawn from a series of secret intelligence reports written by the British (please see the Data Appendix).

The initial value of export goods per worker in a district is calculated as follows:

$$\bar{V}_{1920-23}^d = \sum_g \frac{\bar{V}_{g,1920-23} \times w_g^d}{W_g^T} \quad (2)$$

where  $\bar{V}_{g,1920-23}$  provides the average c.i.f. value of British India exports to the UK in 1920–23,  $g$  indexes all goods exported to the United Kingdom from British India appearing in the *Annual Statements of Foreign Trade of the United Kingdom* for the relevant year, and  $d$  indexes districts.  $w_g^d$  are those that work in the production of the good  $g$  in district  $d$  in 1931, while  $W_g^T$  is the total number of workers producing that good over all districts. Thus the number of workers producing a good acts as a district-specific weight to changes in demand for that good: those areas where relatively more workers are employed will be more affected by changes in value.

Note that as we are looking at the 1931 figures on employment, we are capturing those individuals who chose not to or were unable to adjust to the 1923–33 trade shock by switching out of export-oriented professions or crops. In a “peasant rebellion” interpretation, the ability to adjust should mitigate the estimated effect of the shock by lowering the demand for mobilization among those groups who were able to adjust. Similarly, a demonstrated unwillingness or inability to adjust should strengthen the effect of an extreme negative shock. In contrast, if it is the case, as we argue, that it was those erstwhile exporters who could adjust to domestic production that had their interests most aligned with industrial interests and the promise of future redistribution, we should expect intermediate negative shocks to have the most impact.

We then calculate the percentage shock to the value of export goods per person in a district due to the Great Depression and the imperial preference regime:

$$S_{1923-1933}^d = \frac{\bar{V}_{1930-34}^d - \bar{V}_{1920-23}^d}{\bar{V}_{1920-23}^d} \times 100 \quad (3)$$

We use as our measure the change in the *value* of exports rather than just the world or UK prices as this enables us to capture the changing export mix of goods in response to world demand and the tariff regime, as well as giving us a measure that is intuitive: it is the change in the average revenue product per worker in each district.  $V^d$  can be broken down into its component sectors (manufacturing, cash crops, staple crops, natural resources etc) by doing the analogous calculation over the goods and producers in those sectors. The Appendix provides details of which goods are assigned to which sector.

Our identification strategy rests on the assumption that the value (i.e. equilibrium price and aggregate quantities) of UK imports from India are driven mainly by the fluctuations in the pound, changes in world demand, and the broad tariff regime set in the Ottawa agreement in 1931 favoring British manufactures, rather than by political mobilization by individuals or groups within specific Indian districts.

The identification of the effects of the great depression is particularly plausible given that we do not use district-specific price measures to construct our shock measures. We instead use the c.i.f. value of imported goods from India into Britain for various goods multiplied by district-specific production of those goods in 1931 to construct our shock measure. Thus we are capturing those individuals who by 1931, had either chose not to or were unable to adjust to the 1923-33 trade shock by switching out of export-oriented professions or crops.

It may be the case that rather than there may be large spillovers between the production sectors of a district as is assumed above, that there is limited sectoral mobility and low spillovers, as in the Ricardo-Viner model of trade. Also it may be that national quantities of exports can be influenced by local mobilization relatively more than world prices. In the Appendix, we provide an alternative shock measure that assumes limited sector mobility, and is based solely on price shocks. To allow some spillovers within industry, we also exploit coarser sectoral data on employment from the 1921 census to construct a panel of employment. We then follow Topalova (2010) to construct an alternative employment-weighted price shock experienced by each district. The results are broadly consistent with what we find below.

Negative economic shocks have also been seen as an instigator of peasant rebellion in India (Rothermund, 1992) and increased social conflict more generally (e.g. Dube and Vargas, 2008, Dal Bo and Dal Bo, 2004, Miguel et al., 2004). In a “peasant rebellion” interpretation, the ability to adjust should mitigate the estimated effect of the shock by lowering the demand for mobilization among those groups who were able to adjust. Similarly, a demonstrated unwillingness or inability to adjust should strengthen the effect of an extreme negative shock. In contrast, if it is the case, as we argue, that it was those erstwhile exporters who could adjust to domestic production that had their interests most aligned with industrial interests

and the promise of future redistribution, we should expect intermediate negative shocks to have the most impact.

The fact that we use three independent measures of mobilization to support our argument should increase confidence in our results. Our regressions also employ provincial fixed effects, and therefore only leverage intra-provincial district variation in mobilization. We employ a number of additional district-specific controls for our analysis. These vary depending on the specific dependent variable considered, and are mentioned below, as we present the results of our analysis.

Our key dependent, independent and control variables are summarized in Table 2. While the average district in British India produced export goods worth around Rs. 1.1 per worker in 1923, by 1933, the average Indian district suffered a 47.4% drop in the value of export goods produced there, reflecting the general collapse of prices during the depression. Importantly for our discussion, this mean value masks great variation: approximately 1/3 of the India's districts experienced net positive shocks during the depression, as the combination of imperial preferences and the world demand rose for commodities such as cinchona and myrobalans (for drugs), iron and steel, tin ore, oilseeds and oilnuts, spices and tobacco (Figures 6 and 7.)

## Evidence

Figure 8 presents the raw relationship between export shocks until 1933 and the degree of turnout in the 1937 elections. Separate local polynomial smooths are applied both above and below a zero shock, i.e. for the winner and the loser districts from the Great Depression and the imperial preference regime. Notice that the figure appears, at first, to confirm the perspective of historians that the Great Depression led to mobilization by a 'peasantry' pushed to protest and rebel by the extreme negative shocks of the Depression and imperial policy. The residents of districts that suffered greater negative shocks to the value of their export goods appears to be somewhat more likely to turnout in the elections.

However, Figure 10 suggests that this account is incomplete. The Figure presents the relationship between export shocks until 1933 and the vote share of the Congress party in the 1937 elections. Notice that the shock data are bimodally-distributed above and below zero. Further, there is a concave relationship between the export shock and the Congress Party vote share, with support for Congress attaining a maximum (of around a 60% vote share) with a negative shock to the value of export goods in the district of around 30%. In contrast, districts that suffered greater negative shocks were actually less likely to support the Congress. There is also a sharp drop off in support for Congress among the "winners"

from the imperial preference regime, as the positive shock rises.

These patterns suggest that those worst hit by the Depression, particularly those who had failed to change their factors away from exportables, was not coordinated into support for the opposition. This is consistent with the lack of attraction that Congress' autarkic platform might yield to those who could not substitute easily away from export goods. Instead of being a rebellion of those facing the hardest times, support for Congress came from intermediate districts that were relatively insulated from the Depression shock or able to adjust relatively easily to domestic production. Further, the introduction of imperial preferences appears to have led to a new constituency of beneficiaries from imperial preferences who subsequently also voted against the Congress.

Before we show that these patterns are robust to multivariate analysis, it is worth considering why we use Congress support as our measure of support for independence. We make two points here. First, there is arguably some basis for the stance taken by the Congress that since the nationalist movement needed to put up a united front against the British, votes for non-Congress parties were essentially votes against independence. Second, other than the Muslim League—which has limited electoral support for much of the period that we are considering—most other parties were local parties that did not take a view on national issues.<sup>25</sup> This was the case since, all the way until 1947, Indian legislation only allowed for electoral competition at the local level, which created parties focused on local issues. The Congress' focus on the national question was unusual in this regard, and stemmed from the fact that it was a national movement that was beginning to compete in elections.

Given this discussion, we retain Congress party support as our dependent variable, and proceed with the multivariate analysis. Consider first the analysis of the effects of the depression on the 1937 elections. Table 3 presents an analysis of the determinants of voter turnout during these elections, and Table 4 presents the results of voter support for the Congress party. The dependent variables are presented as a % of the total eligible votes, and total votes polled, respectively. All regressions control for provincial fixed effects, and employ standard errors clustered at the provincial level.

Table 3 examines the determinants of percentage of eligible voters turning out to vote during the 1937 elections. Notice first that, consistent with Figure 8 there is a weak, non-robust negative relationship between the export shock and turnout (1-5), which once again may appear at first to confirm the “Peasant Rebellion” view of the Great Depression and the mass movement for Independence. However beneficiaries from the export shock are also

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<sup>25</sup>Many parties consisted of landlords and local elites, mobilized around local issues. Exceptions include various Communist groups, who had Soviet backing, and the Unionist Party of Punjab, who favored continued ties to Britain.

somewhat more likely to turnout (columns 4-5, 6-7). Other factors that appear to influence turnout are the land tenure system, with voters in districts with more owner-cultivators and landless laborers much less likely to turn out to go to the polls (columns 3, 5, 6).

Table 4 suggests, however, that this weakly increased mobilization in adversely affected districts did not actually manifest itself in greater votes for the party of rebellion and independence, the Congress.<sup>26</sup> Notice first that, consistent with the raw data in Figure 10, there is a robust inverted-U relationship between the export shock and the Congress vote share, implying that support for Congress was maximised in districts which lost around 40% of the value of their goods during the Depression (Cols 1-8). The partial residual plot for the regression in column 7, displayed in Figure 11, is consistent with this analysis. This result is robust to removing outlier exporter districts (column 2), controlling for the extent of employment in manufacturing, different types of land tenure, army recruitment and police presence (columns 3, 4, 6) and for the extent of initial exports by sector (columns 4, 6, 8). The result is also robust to controlling for the extent of turnout in the elections, which actually has a negative effect on the vote share of Congress (columns 5-10).

Thus the accounts of historians that conflate mobilization with support for independence may be missing an important piece of the puzzle. Those districts adversely affected by the Depression did appear to mobilize more, however this mobilization did not appear to favor Congress. Columns 7-10 explore the effect on Congress vote share of a positive trade shock, parametrising this first as an interaction (columns 7, 8) and next by decomposing the export shock in gains and losses (columns 9, 10).<sup>27</sup> Notice that, again consistent with Figure 10, those districts that experienced the most gains from the Great Depression and the system of imperial preferences, and thus the inter-dependence with the United Kingdom, were significantly less likely to vote for the party of decolonization and independence.

While various measures of land tenure do not appear to be major determinants of support for Congress in the 1937 elections, perhaps because of the limited franchise, the proportion of males employed in industry does appear to have had a robust positive effect. This is consistent with the Congress platform that would have favored protection for industry against the UK manufactures that received preferential treatment under the imperial preference

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<sup>26</sup>The official election report for the 1937 election, tabled in Britain's House of Commons, only notes the votes received by winner and runner up candidates and their partisan affiliation. The Congress vote received variable is calculated from this, and is therefore properly defined as the % of the votes received by the Congress party in districts where there was at least one constituency where the party was the winner or runner-up. This is an underestimate of the true Congress vote share, since it excludes the votes received by Congress candidates if they were not in the top two candidates. We drop the 18 districts where no Congress candidate was the winner or runner-up.

<sup>27</sup>The gain (loss) is calculated as: 0 if the shock is negative (positive) and the value of the shock otherwise. Thus:  $shock = gains - loss$



system.<sup>28</sup>

Table 5 examines the extent to which the change in interests due to the Great Depression and the institution of imperial preferences persisted until the eve of Independence, using data on primary party membership by district published by the All-India Congress Committee in 1946. Notice that there are similar patterns to the 1937 elections—the most adversely affected districts from the Great Depression, and those that gained from imperial preferences, were both less likely to field paid-up party members (columns 6-10). By 1946, Congress membership was greatest in districts that suffered around 20-30% losses to the value of their exports. Congress membership was more prevalent in areas that had land tenure systems that favored rentiers (non-cultivating landlords or tenants) and more landless laborers (see also Figure 12).

A third measure of support for Congress can be found during the Quit India movement, also known as the ‘Great Rebellion’ or the August *Kranti*, a violent uprising that took place during 1942. The Congress had resigned en masse from its control of provincial ministries in 1939 following the unilateral decision by the Viceroy of India, Lord Linlithgow, having declared war on Germany on India’s behalf with consultation. With Japan’s entry, Britain promised autonomy for India after the war in exchange for support in the war. With Britain’s track record of renegeing on similar promises made in World War 1, and a Mission, led by Sir Stafford Cripps, failing to reach agreement with the Congress and the Muslim League on the issue of religious electorates and provincial secession (which opened the door to Partition) the Congress finally launched a mass non-violent mobilization in August 1942 with the objective that the British should “Quit India”. In a synchronized action, within a few hours after the protests began, the British arrested and imprisoned an estimated 60,000 Congress cadres, including the entire national leadership. This process was made easier by the fact that many were explicitly courting arrest.

Immediately after the arrests, violence spread through much of India. By the end of August, Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, reported to Churchill: “I am engaged here in meeting by far the most serious rebellion since that of 1857, the gravity and the extent of which we have so far concealed from the world for reasons of military security”<sup>29</sup>. The suppression of the movement required 8 British Brigades and 57 Indian Battalions. In some instances, the Royal Air Force machine-gunned crowds from the air.<sup>30</sup> The heavy censorship has long

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<sup>28</sup>Further, the interaction between measure of males in industry and the export shock is also negative, suggesting that industrialized districts that were adversely affected by the shock were more likely to support Congress (results not shown).

<sup>29</sup>Viceroy Linlithgow to Churchill (31 Aug. 1942)

<sup>30</sup>As Linlithgow wrote to the Secretary of State for India: “If you have any trouble in the debate [in Parliament] about shooting from air, it may be worthwhile mentioning that in many cases this action was taken against mobs engaged in tearing up lines on vital strategic railways in areas which ground-floor forces

concealed the full magnitude of the mobilization. By bringing together all declassified secret reports on the Quit India rebellion from each province, we believe for the first time, we are able to shed new light on its dynamics.

Our Quit India dependent variable is a (log transformed) count of the number of events—violent/non-violent, Gandhian/non-Gandhian etc.—listed in the British administration’s “Secret Reports” as having occurred in each district during the Quit India struggle.<sup>31</sup> Quit India protests spread throughout the sub-continent, with Bengal, Bihar, Bombay, the Central Provinces, Delhi, Madras, Sind and the North-West Frontier particularly affected (Figure 13).

The day after much of the Congress organization was effectively removed from the scene, non-violent protests deteriorated rapidly into violence 2. This we interpret as *prima facie* evidence for the importance of the Congress organization in having kept the movement non-violent the day before, and in the campaigns preceding. Though areas that had civil disobedience were also likely to have violent rebellions, violence was particularly concentrated in export-intensive districts with zamindari (landlord) tenure systems (Figure 14 and Figure 6(a)).

A second piece of evidence that we use to test the relevance of the Congress organization is a measure of the spatial variation of the organization of the freedom movement across the districts of British India. Although we lack systematic data on Congress organization for all of India, we do have a measure for Congress organization for the province of Bombay. Bombay was composed of 25 districts, was to be later split into the provinces of Bombay and Sind, and spanned some of the territories of what was to become the states of Sind (in Pakistan), Maharashtra, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Karnataka (in India). Data on variation in Congress organization across the province comes from a fortuitous listing— the *Bombay Government Gazette Extraordinary of January 5, 1932* of Congress-affiliated organizations banned by the British during the civil disobedience movement of 1932.<sup>32</sup> Banned organizations include district, taluk and village level Congress committees, Congress Panchayat Committees or Courts, “spinning schools,” and various religious affiliates.

Figure 15 provides the relation between this measure of organization, the extent of non-violent and violent Quit India mobilization, and the ratio of the two. The figure confirms that there was more violent than non-violent mobilization in 1942. Recall that this was the case since practically the entire Congress leadership was imprisoned at the start of the Quit India movement. The first two graphs also suggest that Congress organizational lega-

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could not reach ... But this is not true of all cases in which firing occurred from aircraft...”-Viceroy to Sec. State (4 Oct. 1942).

<sup>31</sup>Using negative binomial or Poisson specifications yield very consistent results (not shown).

<sup>32</sup>*Public and Judicial Department: Civil Disobedience Movement: Reports of Events in Bombay*(IOR L/PJ/7/298).

cies were associated with both greater non-violent and violent mobilization. These figures are consistent with the view that organizational legacies helped India's masses overcome their collective action problems. The third figure further suggests that organizational legacies were particularly effective at mobilizing people non-violently, such that although places with greater organizational histories experienced greater violent mobilization, the increase in non-violent mobilization due to organization outstripped this. Figure ?? further confirms these relationships, by showing the patterns of non-violent and violent protests in areas with greater endowed grassroots Congress organizations in the days following the Quit India declaration. Notice that districts with greater endowed grassroots organization exhibit less violent mobilization and greater non-violent mobilization than other Bombay and Sind districts throughout the rebellion.

Examining the broader cross-section, as Table 6(1-5) reveals, Quit India protests once again show the inverted- U relationship with our export shock, with falls both for gains and for large losses. Quit India protests were also more likely both in districts more exposed to industry and in landlord districts. Columns 6-16 decompose the Quit India relationship into violent and non-violent protests. As Columns (6-10) reveal, export shocks show consistent, but not precisely estimated effects on the incidence of non-violent civil disobedience. Non-violent protests was also more likely in industrial districts. In contrast, as Columns (11-15) suggest, a much stronger relationship is visible between export shocks and violent protest. In contrast to the acts of civil disobedience and consistent with Figure 14 , violence was also more likely to occur in landlord districts.<sup>33</sup>

Table 7 examines particular types of violence in the Quit India rebellion– targeted at public infrastructure (the railways), at property, and at records (particularly of taxes and debts). Once again there is a broadly consistent picture: violence was less likely in districts that had a positive export shock in this period, and more likely in areas that suffered a negative shock. Once again, industrial districts were more likely to see additional incidents. Property and records were more likely to be destroyed in landlord districts.

## Discussion and conclusions

This paper provides the first systematic empirical analysis of the determinants of support for the Indian Independence Movement from 1936 to 1946, and for non-violent vs violent action during the Quit India Rebellion of 1942. We find that while industrialised districts

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<sup>33</sup>This outbreak of violent conflict also seems consistent with the negative legacy of landlord areas noted by Banerjee and Iyer (2005), though it suggests that the differences that they note which emerge only after public policy changes in the 1970s may be reflected in other suboptimal outcomes prior to that period.

were likely supporters of Independence, they were joined by mainly agricultural districts that received moderate negative shocks to the international value of their export goods. We argue that it was the combination of the former, who brought capital and resources, and the latter, the future median voters of India, that forged the Indian independence movement into a broad, subcontinental mass movement.

Further it is likely that the mass movement brought with it mutually complementary incentives that strengthened the coalition and its commitment to democracy. Depending, as it did, upon a broad-based mass movement that encompassed India's rural poor, Congress could credibly promise the extension of the democratic franchise to them. Democracy in turn made credible the Movement's promise of land reforms. To complete this circle, the credible promise of land reforms provided additional incentives for agriculturalists to mobilize for Independence in the first place. India's mass mobilization thus may have generated a congruence between political power and the redistribution of economic wealth that led to the consolidation of the world's most surprising democracies.<sup>34</sup>

It is significant to note the contrast with the Muslim League, the party that would come to rule Pakistan, which in contrast to the Congress, was largely controlled by a relatively narrow elite, was based upon ethnic mobilization rather than broad cross-cutting interests, and did not promise land redistribution (eg Tudor, 2013). The lack of the mutual complementarity enjoyed by India between the mass movement, the credibility of land reforms and the democratic franchise may in fact go some length to explaining why Pakistan, despite emerging from a similar cultural and historical context, did not develop a consolidated democracy.

More generally, our study suggests a additional but neglected legacy of colonization. In other states too, the forging of national parties of Independence that span broad groups may displace traditional left-right or ethnic party competition in favor of strong, single-party rule, with profound and lasting effects on the future direction of policymaking and reform.<sup>35</sup> As in India, trade policy in particular may be affected, as such parties may use high tariff barriers to generate lobbying contributions that help buy and maintain single party dominance (Milner and Mukherjee, 2011).

Beyond the coalition that brought independence and democracy to much of South Asia, India's freedom struggle provided the world with an archetypal example of the potential of non-violent resistance as a tool for institutional change. While the broader lessons to be

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<sup>34</sup>This resonates with work by Greif (2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) on the importance of such congruence between political and economic sources of power in sustaining institutional equilibria.

<sup>35</sup>Our work resonates with studies arguing that founding elections set the patterns for subsequent political competition (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, Wittenberg, 2006), and the nature of the mobilization preceding independence in forging subsequent outcomes (Ponce and Wantchekon, 2013).

learned require a deeper comparative analysis of other movements around the world, and are part of our ongoing research, even looking within the epochs of India's own Independence movement may provide important clues to the promise and limitations of non-violent resistance.

First, while even small numbers of violent agents can foment fear that can lead to changes in policy, the effectiveness of a non-violent movement is clearly increasing in participation. For this, the movement needed incentives. We argue that Congress failed in its first attempts at civil disobedience in 1919-23 because its desire to mobilize individuals to make costly sacrifices in the name of non-violence, ethnic solidarity, increased Indian representation in government and protectionism was not aligned with the interests of many of its target supporters. However, though Congress failed in its policy objectives in the Non-Cooperation Movement, it did introduce some important organizational innovations. By using material sacrifice and peaceful civil disobedience itself as a group-specific screening device, the Congress organization appears ironically to have exploited the same logic as cults and terrorist organizations in selecting its leadership from those truly committed to its non-violent methods and its non-sectarian political ideals.

This organization, we argue, gained its opportunity when the economic shocks of 1925-1931 reduced the gains from Empire for many Indians. With both incentives for mass mobilization and the organization to keep it peaceful, the Congress was ultimately able to win democratic self-government and freedom at midnight from an empire upon which the sun was said never to set. South Asia's struggle for independence has long been an example for freedom struggles around the world. Yet there may yet be more that it can teach us.

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Table 2: Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	
				Losers	Gainers
All India					
Congress membership per 100,000	459	9.7	16.4	12.6	2.9 ***
Log. Congress membership per 100,000, 1946	459	1.3	1.5	1.7	0.4 ***
Quit India event count	20	72.1	44.0	66.1	125.5
Value export goods per worker, 1923	459	1.1	3.9	0.8	1.6
Value export goods per worker- manufactures, 1923	459	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2
Value export goods per worker- natural resources, 1923	459	0.2	2.3	0.3	0.0 **
Value export goods per worker- cash crops, 1923	459	0.6	3.3	0.2	1.5 **
Value export goods per worker- staple crops, 1923	459	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.0 ***
% change value export goods per capita, 1923-33	419	-32.0	32.6	-47.3	20.7 ***
% gains: value export goods per capita, 1923-1933	419	4.6	10.0	0.0	20.7 ***
% losses: value export goods per capita, 1923-1933	419	36.7	24.9	47.3	0.0 ***
Gainer in value of export goods	472	0.3	0.5	0.0	1.0
Log. Population, 1931	459	6.2	1.6	6.4	5.7 ***
Population density, 100,000s/sqkm	446	0.3	2.1	0.2	0.7
% Males in manufacturing industries, 1931	417	2.5	1.7	2.6	2.3
% Males in agriculture, 1931	417	17.4	7.3	18.1	15.1 ***
% Male non-cultivating landlords or tenants, 1931	417	0.5	0.7	0.5	0.4 **
% Males owner-cultivators, 1931	417	5.3	5.5	5.6	4.6
% Males unlanded agricultural labourers, 1931	417	3.7	3.7	4.0	2.5 ***
Armymen per 100,000, 1931	417	1.5	6.2	1.8	0.7 **
Police per 100,000, 1931	417	1.9	3.1	1.9	1.9
Proportion Muslim	459	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2 ***
British India					
Turnout, % of eligible voters	204	56.7	12.5	57.1	52.2
Congress vote, % of votes	188	43.7	23.8	44.2	39.3
Number of candidates	204	16.4	9.7	16.3	18.0
Number of seats	204	6.1	3.4	6.1	6.7
Registered voters, 10,000s	204	13.5	10.1	13.7	11.5
Congress membership per 100,000	203	19.1	18.6	19.5	15.2
Log. Congress membership per 100,000, 1946	203	2.6	1.0	2.6	2.3
Quit India event count	20	72.1	44.0	66.1	125.5
Value export goods per worker, 1923	203	1.9	4.9	0.9	11.8 ***
Value export goods per worker- manufactures, 1923	203	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Value export goods per worker- natural resources, 1923	203	0.2	1.5	0.3	0.0 *
Value export goods per worker- cash crops, 1923	203	1.2	4.9	0.3	11.4 ***
Value export goods per worker- staple crops, 1923	203	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.0 ***
% change value export goods per capita, 1923-33	201	-47.4	22.5	-51.8	11.8 ***
% gains: value export goods per capita, 1923-1933	201	0.8	3.3	0.0	11.8 ***
% losses: value export goods per capita, 1923-1933	201	48.2	20.4	51.8	0.0 ***
Gainer in value of export goods	204	0.1	0.3	0.0	1.0
Log. Population, 1931	203	6.9	0.7	6.9	6.7
Population density, 100,000s/sqkm	202	0.4	2.9	0.2	3.0
% Males in manufacturing industries, 1931	200	2.7	1.7	2.8	1.6 ***
% Males in agriculture, 1931	200	19.3	4.3	19.1	21.6 *
% Male non-cultivating landlords or tenants, 1931	200	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.4
% Males owner-cultivators, 1931	200	6.1	5.0	5.9	8.5
% Males unlanded agricultural labourers, 1931	200	4.5	3.3	4.7	1.9 ***
Armymen per 100,000, 1931	200	0.8	2.4	0.8	0.3
Police per 100,000, 1931	200	1.5	1.2	1.5	1.1 **
Proportion Muslim	203	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2

Notes: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 using two-sided difference in means Welch t-tests.

Sources: Author's calculations. See text for details.

Table 3: Regression: % Turnout, 1937 elections

OLS with Native State / Province Fixed Effects	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	British India	Trimming Exports	British India	British India	British India	British India	British India
Value export goods per worker, 1923	-0.516*** [0.119]	-1.656* [0.836]	-0.608*** [0.134]	-0.604** [0.215]	-0.432*** [0.139]	-0.679*** [0.152]	-0.658*** [0.113]
Prop. change value export goods per capita	-4.871 [7.343]	-9.391 [7.173]	-3.900 [6.697]	-34.493* [15.870]	-28.406* [14.050]		
Prop. change value export goods per capita^2	-2.010 [8.532]	-7.216 [8.595]	-2.277 [7.400]	-30.954* [16.762]	-25.741* [12.047]		
Gainer in value of export goods				10.171 [6.058]	15.392** [6.232]		
Gainer x % change in value				0.295 [0.618]	-0.584 [0.567]		
% Gains: value export goods per cap., 1923-1933						0.274 [0.252]	0.041 [0.227]
% Losses: value export goods per cap., 1923-1933						0.047 [0.051]	0.024 [0.055]
% Males in manufacturing industries, 1931			-0.584 [0.721]		-0.640 [0.728]		-0.569 [0.719]
% Males in agriculture, 1931			0.380 [0.337]		0.351 [0.329]		0.383 [0.337]
% Male non-cultivating landlords or tenants, 1931			1.620 [2.157]		1.585 [2.028]		1.689 [2.105]
% Males owner-cultivators, 1931			-0.828* [0.398]		-0.883** [0.389]		-0.828* [0.397]
% Males unlanded agricultural labourers, 1931			-0.544* [0.259]		-0.502* [0.257]		-0.543* [0.266]
Armymen per 100,000, 1931			-0.383 [0.442]		-0.364 [0.479]		-0.383 [0.438]
Police per 100,000, 1931			-0.104 [0.835]		-0.009 [0.844]		-0.078 [0.847]
Proportion Muslim			1.161 [3.849]		1.960 [3.435]		0.935 [3.632]
Electoral controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	199	191	199	199	199	199	199
R-squared	0.45	0.44	0.50	0.46	0.51	0.45	0.50

Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the Native State/ Province level. \* significant at 10%; \*\* 5%; \*\*\* 1%; All regressions include controls for log. population 1931, population density.++: Electorate controls include: No of Candidates, No of Seats, No of Registered voters. Districts with 1923 export values per capita of Rs 10 are dropped in Col 2.

Table 4: **Regression: % Congress Vote Share, 1937**

OLS with Native State/ Province Fixed Effects											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	
	British India	Trimming Exports	British India	British India	British India	British India	British India	British India	British India	British India	
Value export goods per worker, 1923	0.617* [0.307]	-0.634 [2.383]	0.096-16.228*** [0.464]	0.537-15.704*** [3.472]	0.537-15.704*** [0.315]	1.170***-15.361*** [3.278]	1.170***-15.361*** [0.221]	1.087***-14.873*** [3.423]	1.087***-14.873*** [0.309]	1.087***-14.873*** [2.880]	
Prop. change value export goods per capita	-54.487*** [13.340]	-36.107* [19.430]	-41.884* [21.288]	-54.492*** [17.372]	-54.492*** [14.296]	-42.576** [17.104]	-53.923* [27.200]	-39.808 [34.881]			
Prop. change value export goods per capita^2	-70.705*** [14.740]	-54.737** [21.569]	-35.862 [25.219]	-49.968* [25.271]	-70.766*** [16.929]	-51.571* [25.144]	-68.661* [33.006]	-47.901 [42.755]			
Gainer in value of export goods							18.501	18.407			
Gainer x % change in value							[12.491]	[16.264]			
							-2.189*	-2.337			
							[1.111]	[1.648]			
% Gains: value export goods per cap., 1923-1933									-2.366***	-1.892***	
									[0.327]	[0.512]	
% Losses: value export goods per cap., 1923-1933									-0.113	-0.06	
									[0.111]	[0.090]	
% Turnout					-0.367** [0.137]	-0.312 [0.204]	-0.383** [0.138]	-0.341 [0.213]	-0.351** [0.140]	-0.307 [0.204]	
% Males in manufacturing industries, 1931			4.433* [2.449]	2.767* [1.391]		2.690* [1.385]		2.715* [1.409]		2.777* [1.365]	
% Males in agriculture, 1931			0.761 [0.738]	0.818 [0.650]		0.891 [0.647]		0.992 [0.671]		1.032 [0.634]	
% Male non-cultivating landlords or tenants, 1931			2.112 [7.592]	3.444 [3.452]		3.69 [3.582]		3.962 [3.513]		4.136 [3.518]	
% Males owner-cultivators, 1931			-0.46 [0.673]	-0.428 [0.718]		-0.592 [0.793]		-0.795 [0.828]		-0.775 [0.784]	
% Males unlanded agricultural labourers, 1931			-0.344 [0.923]	-0.361 [0.994]		-0.479 [1.025]		-0.535 [1.025]		-0.587 [1.116]	
Armymen per 100,000, 1931			-0.838 [0.524]	-0.33 [0.722]		-0.679 [0.728]		-0.755 [0.768]		-0.646 [0.754]	
Police per 100,000, 1931			3.312* [1.601]	1.14 [1.557]		1.116 [1.709]		1.389 [1.673]		1.156 [1.633]	
Proportion Muslim			-27.63 [20.454]	-30.15 [17.872]		-26.905 [20.252]		-25.433 [20.758]		-27.674 [18.891]	
% Export shock implying maximum Congress support	-0.385	-0.330	-0.578	-0.420	-0.385	-0.413	-0.393	-0.416			
Controls for initial value by sector+	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	
Electorate controls++	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Observations	183	175	183	183	183	183	183	183	183	183	
R-squared	0.52	0.53	0.58	0.60	0.54	0.61	0.54	0.62	0.54	0.61	

Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the Native State/ Province level. \* significant at 10%; \*\* 5%; \*\*\* 1%; All regressions include controls for log. population 1931, population density.+; sectors include: Manufactures, Natural resources, Cash crops and Staple crops, 1920-23. ++: Electorate controls include: No of Candidates, No of Seats, No of Registered voters. Districts with 1923 export values per capita of Rs 10 are dropped in Col 2.

Table 5: Regression: Log. Primary Congress Members, 1946

OLS with Native State/ Province Fixed Effects										
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Full sample	Dropping Ahmad.	Trimming exports	Dropping Ahmad.	Dropping Ahmad.	Full sample	Full sample	Dropping Ahmad.	Full sample	Dropping Ahmad.
Value export goods per worker, 1923	0.023 [0.016]	0.023 [0.016]	0.058 [0.045]	0.025* [0.014]	-0.025 [0.029]	0.019 [0.016]	0.021 [0.015]	-0.022 [0.033]	0.020 [0.017]	-0.021 [0.028]
Prop. change value export goods per capita	-0.439** [0.187]	-0.426** [0.190]	-0.458** [0.186]	-0.399** [0.189]	-0.416** [0.177]	-2.282** [0.875]	-2.249** [0.868]	-1.957*** [0.720]		
Prop. change value export goods per capita^2	-1.169*** [0.383]	-1.091*** [0.392]	-1.170*** [0.394]	-0.990*** [0.320]	-1.043*** [0.323]	-3.255*** [1.051]	-3.159*** [1.018]	-2.761*** [0.866]		
Gainer in value of export goods						0.172 [0.171]	0.173 [0.175]	0.127 [0.195]		
Gainer x % change in value						0.035** [0.014]	0.033** [0.013]	0.029** [0.012]		
% Gains: value export goods per cap., 1923-1933									-0.008** [0.004]	-0.007** [0.003]
% Losses: value export goods per cap., 1923-1933									-0.004 [0.003]	-0.002 [0.003]
% Males in manufacturing industries, 1931				0.075 [0.048]	0.078 [0.059]			0.076 [0.060]		0.079 [0.064]
% Males in agriculture, 1931				-0.007 [0.011]	-0.007 [0.010]			-0.009 [0.010]		-0.008 [0.010]
% Male non-cultivating landlords or tenants, 1931				0.094** [0.047]	0.087* [0.043]			0.079* [0.043]		0.093** [0.046]
% Males owner-cultivators, 1931				0.011 [0.014]	0.012 [0.013]			0.013 [0.014]		0.009 [0.013]
% Males unlanded agricultural labourers, 1931				0.023** [0.011]	0.024** [0.012]			0.027** [0.012]		0.025** [0.012]
Armymen per 100,000, 1931				-0.001 [0.005]	-0.001 [0.005]			-0.001 [0.005]		-0.002 [0.005]
Police per 100,000, 1931				-0.041** [0.018]	-0.041** [0.019]			-0.038* [0.020]		-0.042** [0.018]
Proportion Muslim				-0.235 [0.545]	-0.214 [0.546]			-0.162 [0.503]		-0.298 [0.605]
% Export shock implying maximum Congress support	-0.188 N	-0.195 N	-0.196 N	-0.202 N	-0.199 Y	-0.351 N	-0.394 N	-0.354 Y		
Controls for initial value by sector+									N	Y
Observations	405	404	396	404	404	417	405	404	417	404
R-squared	0.82	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.84	0.82	0.83

Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the Native State/ Province level. \* significant at 10%; \*\* 5%; \*\*\* 1%; All regressions include controls for log. population 1931 and population density. +: sectors include: Manufactures, Natural resources, Cash crops and Staple crops, 1920-23. Ahmadabad- as location of Gandhi's ashram at Sabarmati was a Congress headquarters, so was an outlier in membership. Districts with 1923 export values per capita of Rs 10 are dropped in Col 4.

Table 6: Regression: Non-violent and Violent Protests in the Quit India ‘Rebellion’, 1942

OLS: Log. Number of incidents																
	All Incidents					Non-violent mass civil disobedience					Violent mass protest					
	Init. Export		Trimming		Full sample	Init. Export		Trimming		Full sample	Init. Export		Trimming		Full sample	
	Full sample	Sector Controls	Exports	Exports		Sector Controls	Exports	Sector Controls	Exports							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	
Value export goods per worker, 1923	-0.011*** [0.004]	-0.040 [0.030]	-0.036 [0.064]	-0.008 [0.006]	-0.008 [0.006]	-0.003 [0.002]	0.010 [0.031]	0.036 [0.032]	-0.001 [0.003]	-0.001 [0.003]	-0.017 [0.012]	-0.007 [0.025]	0.046 [0.095]	-0.016 [0.015]	-0.016 [0.015]	
Prop. change value export goods per capita	-0.242* [0.126]	-0.386*** [0.110]	-0.206 [0.124]	-0.259* [0.130]	-0.259* [0.130]	-0.083 [0.053]	-0.111** [0.051]	-0.076 [0.053]	-0.099** [0.053]	-0.099** [0.053]	-0.294** [0.131]	-0.346*** [0.098]	-0.241** [0.103]	-0.301** [0.138]	-0.301** [0.138]	
Prop. change value export goods per capita^2	-1.130** [0.459]	-1.123** [0.428]	-1.134** [0.455]	-0.991** [0.474]	-0.991** [0.474]	-0.409* [0.236]	-0.441* [0.251]	-0.371 [0.221]	-0.376 [0.229]	-1.293*** [0.432]	-1.293*** [0.432]	-1.287*** [0.435]	-1.205*** [0.440]	-1.160** [0.477]	-1.160** [0.477]	
% Gains: value export goods per capita, 1923-1933					-0.009** [0.004]					-0.003 [0.002]					-0.009** [0.004]	
% Losses: value export goods per capita, 1923-1933					-0.005* [0.003]					-0.002 [0.001]					-0.005* [0.003]	
Log. Population, 1931	0.066 [0.040]	0.071* [0.039]	0.061 [0.040]	0.096 [0.061]	0.1 [0.061]	0.017 [0.021]	0.017 [0.022]	0.009 [0.021]	0.019 [0.022]	0.021 [0.022]	0.046 [0.030]	0.050* [0.028]	0.038 [0.029]	0.081 [0.054]	0.085 [0.055]	
Population density, 100,000s/sqkm	0.414 [0.337]	0.402 [0.300]	0.407 [0.337]	0.421 [0.375]	0.437 [0.380]	0.210 [0.204]	0.210 [0.194]	0.216 [0.203]	0.186 [0.208]	0.191 [0.210]	0.359 [0.286]	0.345 [0.260]	0.339 [0.269]	0.390 [0.344]	0.407 [0.350]	
% Males in manufacturing industries, 1931				0.081*** [0.028]	0.083*** [0.027]					0.031* [0.017]				0.067* [0.036]	0.069* [0.035]	
% Males in agriculture, 1931				-0.005 [0.013]	-0.005 [0.013]					-0.006 [0.008]				0.000 [0.011]	0.000 [0.011]	
% Male non-cultivating landlords, 1931				0.086* [0.043]	0.092** [0.043]					0.039 [0.030]				0.065* [0.035]	0.073* [0.037]	
Armymen per 100,000, 1931				-0.003 [0.004]	-0.003 [0.004]					0.001 [0.002]				-0.001 [0.004]	-0.001 [0.004]	
Police per 100,000, 1931				-0.010 [0.008]	-0.011 [0.008]					-0.005 [0.005]				-0.005 [0.008]	-0.006 [0.008]	
Proportion Muslim				-0.385 [0.321]	-0.424 [0.293]					0.083 [0.159]				-0.501 [0.557]	-0.550 [0.520]	
% Export shock implying maximum incidents	-0.107 Y	-0.172 Y	-0.091 Y	-0.131 Y	-0.131 Y	-0.101 Y	-0.126 Y	-0.102 Y	-0.132 Y	-0.132 Y	-0.114 Y	-0.134 Y	-0.145 Y	-0.175 Y	-0.175 Y	
Province / Native State Fixed Effects	409	409	400	409	409	409	409	400	409	409	409	409	400	409	409	
Observations	850	860	850	860	860	860	860	860	860	860	860	860	860	860	860	
R-squared															0.7	

Robust standard errors, clustered at Native State/Province level.\* significant at 10%; \*\* 5%; \*\*\* 1%. All regressions include Province / Native State Fixed Effects as well as controls for Log. Population 1931 and Population Density. (2,7,12) include separate controls for value of export goods per worker in natural resources, cash crops, manufactures & agriculture. (3,8,13) trim districts with > Rs 10 exports per capita

Table 7: Regression: Decomposing Violent Protests in the Quit India Rebellion, 1942

OLS: Log. Number of incidents, Quit India 1942	Destruction of Railway Infrastructure				Destruction of Property				Destruction of Records			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Value export goods per worker, 1923	-0.014 [0.010]	-0.082*** [0.023]	0.035 [0.056]	-0.011 [0.009]	-0.019 [0.013]	-0.047 [0.042]	0.018 [0.068]	-0.016 [0.014]	-0.013** [0.005]	-0.025 [0.035]	-0.037 [0.069]	-0.011 [0.007]
% gains: value export goods per capita, 1923-1933	-0.007** [0.003]	-0.008** [0.003]	-0.006** [0.003]	-0.007** [0.003]	-0.008** [0.003]	-0.009*** [0.003]	-0.007** [0.003]	-0.007** [0.003]	-0.008** [0.004]	-0.010*** [0.003]	-0.008** [0.004]	-0.008** [0.004]
% losses: value export goods per capita, 1923-1933	-0.004* [0.002]	-0.003 [0.002]	-0.004* [0.002]	-0.003 [0.002]	-0.004* [0.002]	-0.003 [0.002]	-0.005* [0.003]	-0.003 [0.003]	-0.005* [0.003]	-0.004 [0.003]	-0.006* [0.003]	-0.004 [0.003]
Log. Population, 1931	0.051* [0.027]	0.056** [0.027]	0.036 [0.024]	0.075* [0.043]	0.057 [0.034]	0.063* [0.034]	0.043 [0.030]	0.092 [0.058]	0.065* [0.038]	0.070* [0.037]	0.057 [0.038]	0.095 [0.059]
Population density, 100,000/sqkm	0.09 [0.105]	0.073 [0.072]	0.076 [0.090]	0.114 [0.097]	0.392 [0.329]	0.374 [0.280]	0.367 [0.309]	0.417 [0.353]	0.387 [0.320]	0.373 [0.277]	0.378 [0.318]	0.406 [0.355]
% Males in manufacturing industries, 1931				0.072** [0.028]				0.091** [0.045]				0.075** [0.030]
% Males in agriculture, 1931				0.002 [0.006]				-0.002 [0.010]				-0.003 [0.012]
% Male non-cultivating landlords, 1931				0.04 [0.027]				0.086** [0.038]				0.086** [0.040]
Armymen per 100,000, 1931				-0.002 [0.002]				-0.003 [0.004]				-0.003 [0.004]
Police per 100,000, 1931				-0.002 [0.007]				-0.011 [0.009]				-0.01 [0.008]
Proportion Muslim				0.014 [0.084]				-0.45 [0.410]				-0.423 [0.305]
Province / Native State Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	409	409	400	409	409	409	400	409	409	409	400	409
R-squared	0.59	0.62	0.6	0.6	0.79	0.8	0.79	0.8	0.85	0.86	0.85	0.85
Robust standard errors, clustered at Native State/Province level. * significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. All regressions include Province / Native State Fixed Effects as well as controls for Log. Population 1931 and Population Density. (2,6,10) include separate controls for value of export goods per worker in natural resources, cash crops, manufactures & agriculture. (3,7,11) trim districts with > Rs 10 exports per capita												

Robust standard errors, clustered at Native State/Province level. \* significant at 10%; \*\* 5%; \*\*\* 1%. All regressions include Province / Native State Fixed Effects as well as controls for Log. Population 1931 and Population Density. (2,6,10) include separate controls for value of export goods per worker in natural resources, cash crops, manufactures & agriculture. (3,7,11) trim districts with > Rs 10 exports per capita



## Appendix 1: Factor-specific price shocks

Recall that we so far assigned the shocks to the value of India’s exports to the country’s districts using the proportion of country-wide employment for the production of each good in a district. Districts are therefore calculated to experience large shocks even if few people are employed in a sector that experienced a drastic fall in the value of their exports. This shock measure makes sense if there are spillovers from having a particularly lucrative sector in the district, such as might arise through labour mobility. We have also been exploiting the 1931 census, and thus are generating a lower bound estimate of the effects of trade shocks on mobilization, as there may be those who adjusted by switching employment prior to 1931, rather than mobilizing politically.

It may be the case, instead, that there is limited mobility across sectors, as in the Ricardo-Viner model of trade. Also it may be that national quantities of exports can be influenced by local mobilization relatively more than world prices. We therefore construct an alternative shock measure that assumes limited sector mobility, and is based on price shocks. To allow some spillovers within industry, we exploit coarser sectoral data on employment from the 1921 census to construct a panel of employment<sup>36</sup>. We then follow Topalova (2010) to construct the following alternative employment-weighted price shock experienced by each district may be calculated as

$$S_{1921-1931}^d = \sum_g \frac{P_{g,1931} - P_{g,1921}}{P_{g,1921}} \times E_{g,1921} \quad (4)$$

where  $E$  is the proportion of workers employed in producing good  $g$ , sold for price  $P$ .

The alternative price shock measure is—as was the case with the previous measure—bimodal. All districts experienced negative price shocks according to this measure, with few districts experiencing a mildly negative price shock, and most districts experiencing a negative price shocks between -50 and -20%.

Note that the new price shock measure assumes that those employed in non-tradeables experienced no price shock. The calculated price shock measure is therefore endogenous to the sectoral composition of each district, which might be related to the degree of political mobilization in the district, which is our dependent variable. To account for this possible endogeneity problem, and following Topalova (2010), we instrument for price shocks with the tradeables-normalized price shock measure ( $\frac{S_{1921-1931}^d}{\sum_g E_{g,1921}}$ ). Tradeables-normalized price shocks are plausibly exogenous to mobilization since India was a price taker in most export markets, and price changes we driven by shifts in world demand. These normalized price shocks will

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<sup>36</sup>There are  $X$  categories relative to the  $Y$  in the 1931 cross-section. The coarser categories allow us some spillovers, such as that employees in the production of all minerals to experience a common shock rather than just those specifically in the iron industry

only affect mobilization through their effect (if any) on the price shocks.

Tables 8 and 9 report the results of regressions that examine the effects of the alternative price shock measure on the proportion of seats in a district won by the Congress. In both tables, regressions 1-3 start with examining the simplest relationship between shocks and mobilization, and then successively add more controls. Price shocks, however, do not achieve the expected signs and significance levels until the two-stage least squares estimates (regression 4), which suggest that mobilization generally increases as price shocks become more moderate. This corroborates our central account. If grievances were causing mobilization, we would expect the opposite to hold. That is, we would have expected the worst hit districts to support the Congress the most. The fact that these districts do not support Congress points to the importance of incentives. The moderately hit have the incentive and capability to support the Congress. Lastly, these regressions also allow us to rule out the possibility that nationalism explains mobilization. The coefficient on the number of journalists in a district—a proxy for print capitalism, which, per Anderson (1983) is thought to cause the rise of nationalism—is not associated with mobilization.

## **Appendix 2: Pledge taken by the Indian National Congress at Lahore, 26th January 1930.**

We believe that it is the inalienable right of the Indian people, as of any other people, to have freedom and to enjoy the fruits of their toil and have the necessities of life, so that they may have full opportunities of growth. We believe also that if any government deprives a people of these rights and oppresses them, the people have a further right to alter it or to abolish it. The British government in India has not only deprived the Indian people of their freedom but has based itself on the exploitation of the masses, and has ruined India economically, politically, culturally, and spiritually. We believe, therefore, that India must sever the British connection and attain *Purna Swaraj*, or complete independence.

India has been ruined economically. The revenue derived from our people is out of all proportion to our income. Our average income is seven pice (less than two pence) per day, and of the heavy taxes we pay 20% are raised from the land revenue derived from the peasantry and 3% from the salt tax, which falls most heavily on the poor.

Village industries, such as hand-spinning, have been destroyed, leaving the peasantry idle for at least four months in the year, and dulling their intellect for want of handicrafts, and nothing has been substituted, as in other countries, for the crafts thus destroyed.

Customs and currency have been so manipulated as to bring further burdens on the peasantry. British manufactured goods constitute the bulk of our imports. Customs duties betray partiality for British manufacturers, and revenue from them is used not to lessen the burden on the masses but for sustaining a highly extravagant administration. Still more

Table 8: Appendix Regression 1: Probability of a Congress Seat Win, 1937 (Specific Factors and Price Shocks)

Estimator:	1	2	3	4			5
DV (M=% seats Congress won; S=shocks):	OLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS			OLS
	M	M	M	S	S <sup>2</sup>	M	M
% Price shock, 1921-31	0.143 [0.575]	-0.974 [1.012]	-0.707 [0.498]			-1.638** [0.764]	
% Price shock, 1921-31, squared		-0.0198 [0.0204]	-0.0146 [0.0107]			-0.0410** [0.0160]	
Tradeables-norm. % price shock, 1921-31				1.397** [0.563]	-15.15 [26.36]		-1.667 [1.073]
Tradeables-norm. % price shock, 1921-31, squared				0.00909 [0.00683]	0.217 [0.356]		-0.0238 [0.0140]
Ln 1+% industrial workers, 1931	6.005 [12.20]	4.603 [12.45]	2.574 [4.816]	3.008* [1.373]	-214.6** [86.77]	-1.087 [4.966]	2.784 [3.879]
Ln 1+% journalists, 1931	-229.4 [381.6]	-81.45 [424.8]	-5.493 [372.2]	146.6** [45.52]	-1158.6 [3414.6]	106 [373.6]	-86.7 [362.8]
No. of candidates			-0.254 [0.480]	0.00133 [0.0606]	-1.219 [3.884]	-0.364 [0.409]	-0.317 [0.450]
No. of seats			-1.244 [1.605]	-0.0422 [0.216]	2.377 [14.50]	-0.989 [1.386]	-1.017 [1.472]
Ln electors			13.10** [4.882]	0.325 [0.332]	-0.33 [26.01]	12.98*** [4.008]	12.46** [4.684]
Ln population, 1931			7.331 [5.865]	0.767 [1.027]	-24.05 [64.93]	7.334 [5.929]	7.063 [6.597]
Ln 1+% Muslim, 1931			-7.970** [2.683]	-0.19 [0.657]	9.872 [41.00]	-7.357*** [1.875]	-7.451** [2.333]
Ln area, in sq. km			-1.449 [2.959]	-0.65 [0.463]	33.63 [27.84]	-0.906 [2.307]	-1.22 [2.917]
Armymen per 100,000, 1931			0.0153 [0.278]	0.225 [0.149]	-15.15 [8.430]	-0.0297 [0.195]	0.223 [0.333]
Police per 100,000, 1931			3.195* [1.605]	0.525 [0.619]	-27.36 [35.92]	2.545 [1.589]	2.807 [1.876]
Ln 1+% male owner-cultivator, 1931			-5.174** [1.510]	0.217 [0.979]	15.29 [61.36]	-4.619*** [1.588]	-5.602*** [1.232]
Ln 1+% male unlanded agricultural laborer, 1931			4.904 [3.096]	-1.025 [0.823]	66.06 [56.69]	5.681** [2.577]	4.652 [2.654]
Ln 1+% non-cultivating landlords, tenants, 1931			11.01* [4.667]	0.203 [1.228]	-12.64 [67.87]	11.20*** [4.127]	11.39* [4.947]
Province fixed effects?	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	180	180	180	180	180	180	180
First-stage F-statistic				53.1***	48.6***		

Robust standard errors, clustered at the province level, in brackets. \* significant at 10%; \*\* 5%; \*\*\* 1%.

Table 9: **Appendix Regression 2: Violent to Non-Violent Protests, 1942 (Specific Factors and Price Shocks)**

	1	2	3	4		5
Estimator:	OLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS		OLS
DV (M=Ln Quit India events; S=shocks):	M	M	M	S	S <sup>2</sup>	M
% Price shock, 1921-31	-0.0208 [0.0177]	0.047 [0.0539]	0.0286 [0.0254]			0.0984*** [0.0315]
% Price shock, 1921-31, squared		0.0012 [0.000797]	0.00024 [0.000503]			0.00165*** [0.000573]
Tradeables-norm. % price shock, 1921-31				1.334** [0.578]	-11 [26.52]	0.113*** [0.0274]
Tradeables-norm. % price shock, 1921-31, squared				0.00841 [0.00691]	0.263 [0.353]	0.00126*** [0.000326]
Ln 1+% industrial workers, 1931	-0.18 [0.269]	-0.0974 [0.235]	0.399** [0.172]	3.048* [1.349]	-217.3** [86.21]	0.521*** [0.199]
Ln 1+% journalists, 1931	27.31** [9.623]	18.97 [11.54]	10.67 [15.24]	183.4*** [46.45]	-3926.6 [3529.2]	2.225 [15.77]
Ln population, 1931			-0.193 [0.175]	0.848 [0.485]	-22.86 [31.48]	-0.168 [0.129]
Ln 1+% Muslim, 1931			0.0509 [0.101]	-0.173 [0.607]	5.656 [37.37]	0.0491 [0.0939]
Ln area, in sq. km			0.0232 [0.111]	-0.405 [0.479]	14.79 [28.91]	0.0311 [0.111]
Armymen per 100,000, 1931			0.00422 [0.0337]	0.307 [0.172]	-21.10* [10.83]	0.0107 [0.0324]
Police per 100,000, 1931			-0.0241 [0.0942]	0.358 [0.536]	-14.49 [32.71]	-0.00184 [0.0889]
Ln 1+% male owner-cultivator, 1931			0.135 [0.110]	0.173 [0.883]	18.6 [56.07]	0.0851 [0.0903]
Ln 1+% male unlanded agricultural laborer, 1931			0.0455 [0.0721]	-1.041 [0.699]	65.74 [50.52]	0.0418 [0.0838]
Ln 1+% non-cultivating landlords, tenants, 1931			0.222 [0.259]	-0.324 [1.148]	22.57 [63.89]	0.24 [0.238]
Constant	0.481 [0.581]	1.273 [0.898]	1.611 [1.157]			2.895** [1.161]
Province fixed effects?	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	184	184	184	184	184	184
First-stage F-statistic				45.3***	38.5***	

Robust standard errors, clustered at the province level, in brackets. \* significant at 10%; \*\* 5%; \*\*\* 1%.

arbitrary has been the manipulation of the exchange ratio which has resulted in millions being drained away from the country.

Politically, India's status has never been so reduced as under the British regime. No reforms have given real political power to the people. The tallest of us have to bend before foreign authority. The rights of free expression of opinion and free association have been denied us, and many of our countrymen are compelled to live in exile abroad and cannot return to their homes. All administrative talent is killed and the masses have to be satisfied with petty village offices and clerkships.

Culturally, the system of education has torn us from our moorings and our training has made us hug the very chains that bind us.

Spiritually, compulsory disarmament has made us unmanly, and the presence of an alien army of occupation, employed with deadly effect to crush in us the spirit of resistance, has made us think that we cannot look after ourselves or put up a defence against foreign aggression, or even defend our brothers and families from the attacks of thieves, robbers, and miscreants.

We hold it to be a crime against man and God to submit any longer to a rule that has caused this four-fold disaster to our country. We recognise, however, that the most effective way of getting our freedom is not through violence. We will therefore prepare ourselves by withdrawing, so far as we can, all voluntary association from the British Government, and will prepare for Civil Disobedience, including non-payment of taxes. We are convinced that if we can but withdraw our voluntary help and stop payment of taxes without doing violence, even under provocation, the end of this inhuman rule is assured. We therefore hereby solemnly resolve to carry out the Congress instructions issued from time to time for the purpose of establishing *Purna Swaraj*.

Appendix A of 'Towards freedom: The autobiography of Jawaharlal Nehru'.

## Data Appendix

We detail the construction of our key dependent and independent variables here.

### 1937 election data

For each of British India's 1,046 constituencies, we entered data on the following fields from the official election returns (Secretary of State for India to Parliament 1937): total votes polled, votes polled and party affiliation for the winning candidate, the size of the electorate, the total number of candidates that ran for office, the number of the seats (while 82% of constituencies were single-member seats, the rest had 2-4 members), and a variable indicating the type of constituency (general, general-urban, general-rural, reserved for scheduled castes, Muslims, Sikhs, Christian, Anglo-Indians, and some other small categories).

To collapse these data to the district level, we first mapped each constituency to an administrative district or districts using the 1935 delimitation report (Secretary of State for India to Parliament 1936). In the 12% of instances where constituencies spanned districts,

we divided the variables evenly between the districts. We then summed the variables across the 199 districts of British India.

### **1942 Quit India data**

These data are based on a series of secret reports written by the administration in response to the Quit India agitations (Government of Bengal 1943, Government of Berar 1943, Government of Bihar 1944, Government of India 1943a-h, Government of Madras 1943, Government of the United Provinces 1943). The reports provide detailed (often daily) accounts of Quit India-related events. The Quit India dependent variable that we employ is the (log-transformed) count of the following events, between August and December 1942: violence, property damage, strikes, meetings, civil disobedience activities, and resignations.

### **1946 Congress primary membership data**

These were obtained from a Congress Party handbook (All India Congress Committee 1946). Primary party members were required to pay an annual membership fee of four annas (equivalent to one-fourth of a rupee) a year. This entitled them to vote in party elections if they had maintained membership for a year. Data are divided by 100,000 and log-transformed.

### **Trade and shock data**

Please see body of the paper.

### **Data sources**

All India Congress Committee. 1946. *Congress Handbook*. Allahabad.

Government of Bengal. 1943. "District Officers' Chronicles of Events of Disturbances Consequent Upon the All-India Congress Committee's Resolution of 8th August 1942 and the Arrest of Congress Leaders Thereafter, August 1942 to the middle of March 1943." Alipore: Bengal Government Press.

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Government of India. 1943a. "Bombay: Six months of the Congress Movement." New Delhi: Government of India Press.

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
\_\_\_\_\_. 1943h. "Narrative Account of Disturbances in Different Districts of the Province of Orissa, August-December 1942." New Delhi: Government of India Press.

Government of Madras. 1943. "District Calendar of Events of the Civil Disobedience Movement, August-December 1942." Madras: Government Press.


Government of the United Provinces. 1943. "The Congress Rebellion in the United Provinces, 1942." Lucknow: Government Branch Press.

Secretary of State for India to Parliament. 1936. "Government of India Act 1935: Report of the Committee appointed in connection with the Delimitation of Constituencies and connected matters." Command paper 5,100. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

Secretary of State for India to Parliament. 1937. "Return Showing the Results of Elections in India." Command paper 5,589. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office.



(a) All districts




(b) Excluding districts with initial export goods >Rs.10 in value per capita


Figure 6: **Initial exports and Depression shocks**

Source: Own calculations, based upon *Annual Statements of Foreign Trade of the United Kingdom* and various Censuses of India





(a) Free trade: Average value of export goods per producer, % of total, 1920-23



(b) Imperial preferences: % change in value of export goods per producer, 1923-33

Figure 7: **Winners and Losers from Imperial Preferences and the Great Depression**

Source: Own calculations, based upon the 1931 census, 1931 agricultural census and various editions of the *Annual Statement of Foreign Trade of the United Kingdom*




Figure 8: **Export shocks and % Turnout, 1937 elections**

Local polynomial smooths, weighted by district population (marker sizes denote relative population). Green boxes represent Muslim majority districts




Figure 9: **Export shocks and % votes for Congress, 1937**

Local polynomial smooths, weighted by district population (marker sizes denote relative population). Green boxes represent Muslim majority districts




Figure 10: **Export shocks and % votes for the Muslim League, 1937**

Local polynomial smooths, weighted by district population. Green boxes represent Muslim majority districts






Figure 11: Partial residual plots




(a) 1936 elections: % Congress votes, 1936 elections



(b) 1946 Congress members per 100,000


Figure 12: **Support for Congress prior to Independence**

Source: Own calculations, based upon official election returns and the Congress Party membership handbook 1946




**Figure 13: Incidents of protest during the Quit India “Rebellion” of 1942**

Protests include: violence, property damage, strikes, meetings, other civil disobedience activities and resignations. Source: Own calculations, based upon secret intelligence reports for each province.



(a) Incidents: Civil Disobedience, 1942, Deciles



(b) Incidents: Violent protest, 1942, Deciles

**Figure 14: Incidents of peaceful and violent protest during the Quit India “Rebellion” of 1942**  
Source: Own calculations, based upon secret intelligence reports for each province.




Figure 15: Violent and non-violent protests in the Quit India movement 1942, by the number of grassroots organizations banned in 1932




Figure 16: Violent and non-violent protests in the Quit India movement 1942 over time in Bombay and Sind Provinces, by the number of grassroots organizations banned in 1932.